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Deterrence and Aggregate Litigation 
 






Abstract: This paper examines the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and class 
actions, with an emphasis on positive value claims.  In the multiple victim scenario 
with positive value claims, the probability that an individual victim will bring suit falls 
toward zero with geometric decay as the number of victims increases.  The reason is 
that the incentive to free ride increases with the number of victims.  Deterrence does 
not collapse but is degraded.  Undercompliance is observed, which worsens as the 
number of victims increases.  Compliance is never socially optimal, and the shortfall 
from optimality increases with the number of victims.  These results, which continue 
to hold even if victims anticipate being joined in a single forum, suggest a more nuanced 
and potentially more robust justification for the class action than has hitherto been 
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Rights without remedies have been viewed as anomalies in the law.  As a result, the 
class action, permitting one or several litigants to sue on behalf of a large group of 
victims, developed as a means of providing a remedy in multiple-victim settings where 
individual incentives to sue are inadequate. 
 
Class action lawsuits fall into two categories: those consisting of negative expected 
value claims, where the expected individual recovery is less than the claimant’s cost of 
litigation (for example, consumer claims), and those consisting of positive expected 
value claims (for example, securities claims).  For negative expected value claims, 
aggregation within the class action is necessary to create a suit with a positive expected 
value.  This has been the fundamental justification for class actions (Coffee 2015).1  
For positive expected value claims, the social desirability of the class action is less clear 
because every claimant can profitably bring his own lawsuit. 2   To be sure, the 
literature has offered theories to justify positive claim class actions on social welfare 
grounds.3  Still, despite the importance of the topic as evidenced by the passage of two 
federal statues regulating class actions,4 the law and economics literature has given 
relatively little attention to the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and class 
actions.5 
 
This paper examines the deterrence properties of aggregate litigation and class actions, 
                                                             
1 Posner makes the same point in Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The device is 
especially important when each claim is too small to justify the expense of a separate suit, so that 
without a class action there would be no relief, however meritorious the claims.” ) 
2 Most discussions assume risk neutral agents who sue whenever the expected value of the claim is 
positive.  If, instead, subjective preferences are taken into account, the welfare effects of both negative 
and positive value claim aggregation would be difficult to assess.  Aggregation might benefit those 
who would prefer to sue but do not do so because of a lack of information on the existence of a potential 
claim, but might injure those who are informed but would prefer not to sue (Eisenberg and Miller, 2004, 
at 1529-30). 
3  See Spier (2002) and Bone (2003) on efficiency in reducing litigation costs and management of 
externalities in limited fund litigation. Rosenberg and Spier (2014) examine incentives to invest in 
litigation, and specifically the class action’s ability to equalize investment incentives for plaintiffs and 
defendants. Che and Spier (2008) examine settlement pathologies in multiple plaintiff settings with a 
fixed cost of litigation shared among plaintiffs. 
4 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 and The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 
5  Among the relatively few exceptions are Bone (2003) and Ulen (2011).  The formal economic 
analyses have tended to focus on ex post settlement incentives.  Che and Spier (2008) examine the 
settlement process and discuss implications of their analysis for injurer incentive dilution.  This paper’s 
model, by contrast, focuses on ex ante incentive effects, and particularly the influence of litigation costs 
(Shavell, 1982; Hylton, 1990). 
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with an emphasis on positive value claims.  Its core finding is that in the multiple 
victim scenario with positive value claims, the probability of individual suit goes to 
zero with geometric decay as the number of victims increases.  This is due to strategic 
behavior, as the incentive to free ride (that is, wait for another litigant to first establish 
liability) increases with the number of victims.  Deterrence does not collapse, as in the 
case of negative value claims, but is degraded.   
 
Undercompliance is likely and becomes the norm as the number of victims increases.  
This is because free riding reduces aggregate liability below aggregate social harm.  
The difference can be made up only if the litigation cost burden on the defendant 
increases sufficiently with the number of victims.  But the litigation cost burden 
threatened by any particular victim shrinks to zero in the limit because of free riding. 
 
Compliance with the law is always less than socially optimal, and the shortfall from 
social optimality increases with the number of victims.  This is a fundamental problem 
– again attributable to strategic behavior – that can be solved most effectively through 
the class action device. In theory, fee shifting could also solve the underdeterrence 
problem, but in reality it is unlikely that any fee shifting scheme could completely 
remove the incentive to free ride among victims.  
 
The free riding result holds even if the first-filing victims anticipate joining in a single 
action.  The reason is that although joinder reduces litigation costs, it does not 
eliminate the incentive to free ride and the resultant undercompliance.  
Counterintuitively, joinder can actually weaken deterrence under some conditions.    
 
The core results of this paper suggest a more nuanced and potentially more robust 
justification for the class action.6  In addition, the results have implications for the 
effectiveness of class action litigation.  The problem of collusive “settlements,” where 
the class action attorney terminates the action in exchange for a side payment from the 
defendant, appears to be governed by the same dynamics as the private litigation 
incentive.  The incentive to free ride implies that the probability of any individual 
plaintiff choosing to monitor approaches zero as the class size expands, and further the 
probability of monitoring by any class member falls as the cost of monitoring rises 
relative to the individual payout.   
 
I also examine the deterrence properties of litigation and class actions when the award 
                                                             
6 To be sure, the literature examining settlement incentives in the multiple plaintiff setting offers 
important justifications for class actions (Spier, 2002, Che and Spier, 2008).  The justifications implied 
in that literature follow from inefficiencies in the settlement process.  In this paper, by contrast, the 
justification for class actions follows essentially from the problem of free riding in the decision to sue.  
In particular, because I find that settlement is precluded by positive transaction costs when the number 
of victims is large (because free riding depresses expected liability to the minimum of the settlement 
range), the findings here on ex ante incentives are independent of settlement pathologies. 
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is unequal to the harm, common in the consumer protection field where plaintiffs often 
seek statutory damages.  Supra-compensatory damages can enhance welfare by 
removing the litigation cost hurdle that induces free riding, but can also result in 
excessive deterrence.  Supra-compensatory damages class actions enhance welfare 
only if the award is less than the sum of the harm and the plaintiff’s cost of litigation. 
 
Lastly, I consider the model’s implications for some issues in securities litigation, such 
as free riding among institutional investors, opting out, and the likely result of 
abolishing securities class actions. The model suggests a method of measuring the 
potential compliance value of class actions consisting of positive value claims. 
 
Part 2 presents the basic model.  Part 3 examines the effects of private litigation with 
multiple victims on incentives to comply with the law and on the social optimality of 
compliance.  Part 3 illustrates the geometric decay of deterrence and also 
demonstrates that compliance is socially inadequate in the multiple victim private 
litigation setting.  Part 4 considers the implications of permissive joinder of plaintiffs.  
Part 5 discusses extensions and implications of the basic model. 
 
2. Basic Model 
 
There are n > 1 victims. The injurer imposes a loss on each of v, and each faces a 
litigation cost cp > 0.  The injurer/defendant bears litigation cost cd > 0.  The injurer 
can take care, incurring a cost of x > 0.  If the injurer does not take care, the probability 
of injury to each victim is p > 0.  If the injurer does take care, the probability of injury 
to each victim is q, where p > q. 
 
The injurer has sufficient assets to compensate all of the victims.  Liability is strict, 
and the injury to each victim arises from a single transaction.7  Thus, proof of liability 
by one victim/plaintiff establishes liability for any other victim.8  Put in legal terms, 
there is one common issue of fact and law (did the injurer comply with the law?) that 
the court will consider to determine liability to all victims who sue.  
 
Victims have “negative value claims” if v ≤ cp (victims do not sue when indifferent) 
                                                             
7 Strict liability is associated with many of the areas in which the availability of the class action has 
made litigation likely: for example, securities litigation (Section 10b5 securities fraud lawsuits), 
consumer fraud (e.g., Truth in Lending Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, etc.), environmental 
litigation (e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (also known 
as Superfund) ). 
8 In legal terms, this model assumes offensive estoppel (issue preclusion): having been found guilty of 
the violation in one lawsuit, the defendant is precluded from relitigating liability in a later lawsuit arising 
from the same transaction.  On offensive issue preclusion, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 
322 (1979). Che and Yi (1993) examine an asymmetric information model of litigation with issue 
preclusion, finding that the first plaintiff can extort a large settlement.    
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and positive value claims if v > cp.9  Equivalently, letting λ = cp/v, claims are negative 
if λ ≥ 1, and positive if λ < 1.  Adopting a parallel notation for defendants, for 




Litigation is highly plausible in this scenario because of the transaction costs of settling 
numerous claims.  Still, it is worthwhile to consider the precise sorts of costs that 
obstruct settlement. 
  
First, note that if claims have negative value (λ ≥ 1), no victim will sue, and the injurer 
will not take care, which is the traditional justification for class actions.  For the 
remainder I assume that victims have positive claims. 
 
Second, since the defendant’s total trial cost v+cd exceeds the award v, the defendant 
would default unless there were significant costs incurred by doing so.  I assume 
therefore that the defendant’s cost of default is greater than cd,10 so that the defendant 
will not choose to default when a claim is filed in court. 
 
Litigation results in this model – or, equivalently, settlement does not occur – because 
of the peculiar incentives of multiple victims and the transaction costs of settlement.  
The transaction costs consist of the costs of negotiation and “holding out” by victims.11   
 
Consider the following sequence.  In the first stage, the injurer decides whether to 
make a settlement offer simultaneously, and publicly observable, to all victims.12  In 
the second stage, the victims decide simultaneously and noncooperatively whether to 
accept the offer, or to reject and hold out for more.  If a victim accepts, the dispute 
between the accepting victim and injurer comes to an end.  If a victim “holds out,” he 
makes a counteroffer to the defendant.  In the third stage, the victim’s counteroffer is 
accepted by the defendant or the parties proceed to litigation.  In the fourth stage, after 
having committed to litigation, the victim chooses either to “Sue” or to “Wait,” where 
the former strategy involves suing immediately and the latter involves waiting to take 
advantage of legal precedent created by an earlier plaintiff.  If the victim sues his 
payoff is v – cp.  If the victim waits and some other victim sues, the waiting victim 
                                                             
9 I assume the lawyer and victim act as a merged entity, so agency costs do not drive a wedge between 
the lawyer’s and the victim’s incentive to litigate.   
10 There are several plausible interpretations of the default cost.  One is to treat v as the expected 
award after consideration of evidence from both parties on damages, where the default cost consists 
of an upward bias in v because of the absence of countervailing evidence in default.  Another cost is 
to the reputation of a defendant who fails to respond to a court summons. 
11 Rave (2013) discusses the holdout problem as a factor driving litigation in the multiple victim setting. 
12 Che and Spier (2008) examine discriminating public offers in the multiple plaintiff setting.  Daughety 
and Reinganum (1999) examine private offers.  I assume offers are public and common to all. 
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receives v because he avoids the cost of proving liability.  If all victims wait, their 
payoffs equal zero, because evidence has grown stale and no prior litigant has used the 
evidence to prove the defendant’s violation.  Transaction costs prevent victims from 
coordinating in advance.13 
 
Examining pure strategies, there are multiple equilibria in the final period: specifically, 
any outcome in which one victim sues and the others wait.  Considering (symmetric) 
mixed strategies, the victim chooses a probability of suit, a, that equalizes the payoff 
from suing, v – cp, and that from waiting.14  Since waiting has a positive reward only 
if some other victim sues, the payoff from waiting is [1-(1-a)n-1]v.  The equilibrium 




Given a*, will the parties settle?  The minimum settlement offer is a*(v – cp) + (1- a*) 
[1-(1- a*)n-1]v = v – cp.  However, because some victims wait, the expected gain from 
settlement is small and disappearing with n.15  Thus, even minimal transaction costs 
preclude settlement in the large numbers case.  In the small numbers case, given the 
offer v – cp, the victim has a weakly dominant strategy to hold out.  The injurer could 
lessen this incentive by raising the offer, but the victims’ tendency to wait constrains 
the scope for such an increase.16  Modest transaction costs should be sufficient to 
eliminate the gain from settlement.  Hence, injurers refuse to make offers in the first 
stage, resulting in litigation. 
 
Proposition 1: For multiple positive claim victims, the equilibrium probability of suit 
by a victim is 𝑎𝑎∗ = 1 − 𝜆𝜆
1
𝑛𝑛−1.  Thus, as the number of victims goes to infinity, each 
victim’s probability of suing goes to zero. 
 
This is a version of the “bystander effect,” which explains why the probability of a 
bystander coming to the aid of a person in distress falls as the number of bystanders 
                                                             
13  See Bone (2011), which also notes that the incentive to free ride will hinder any effort to 
communicate among victims to form the equivalent of a class lawsuit through voluntary joinder. 
14 Symmetry is easy to justify given that the victims are the same.  Justifying mixed strategies is 
admittedly not as straightforward.  With respect to individual incentives, it is plausible that a lawyer 
would have an incentive to randomize because a pure strategy of suing every time would induce the 
other lawyers to free ride, see Reinganum (2008).  An alternative justification is the following selection 
argument: if all lawyers sue immediately, then some lawyers could gain by waiting, and thus there would 
be some percentage of “waiters” at which the expected profit advantage from waiting fully dissipates.  
Finally, the mixed strategy assumption generates simple and plausible comparative statics that are 
consistent with more complex pure strategy analyses of the public-good-provision problem at the base 
of this paper, see Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996). 
15 See appendix, part A.  
16 Id. 
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increases (Darley and Latane, 1968; Diekmann, 1985; Leshem and Tabbach, 2016).  
Here, the victim, deciding when to sue, focuses only on the payoff from suing 
immediately relative to that for waiting.  For any given suit probability, the payoff 
from waiting increases with the number of victims.  In the limit, this incentive to free 
ride causes the individual suit probability to go to zero. 
 
2.2. Effect of Change in Award or Cost 
 
As one would expect, the equilibrium individual suit probability is decreasing in the 
plaintiff’s cost of litigation.17  In addition, the larger is the plaintiff’s litigation cost 
(provided it is less than the award), the smaller is the negative impact of its increase on 
the equilibrium suit probability.18  This is intuitive given the existence of a limit where 
the plaintiff’s cost is equal to the award, beyond which suits will not be brought.  As 
the cost approaches the award, the sensitivity of the equilibrium suit probability to 
changes in the cost tapers off.   
 
The equilibrium suit probability increases with the award. 19   This positive effect 
increases with the size of the award and decreases with the plaintiff’s litigation cost.  
Not surprisingly in view of the free rider incentive, as the number of victims increases, 
the sensitivity of the equilibrium suit probability to changes in either the award or the 
litigation cost goes to zero. 
 
2.3 Expected Liability  
 
The question generated by the finding that the individual suit probability goes to zero 
is whether deterrence collapses in the same manner.  If the injurer’s expected liability 
decays as strongly as the individual suit probability then deterrence would inevitably 
collapse, and the justification for class actions in the positive value setting would be 
indistinguishable from that in the negative value setting.  However, deterrence is a 
function of both the individual suit probability and the number of victims. 
 
The injurer’s expected liability is20 










� < 0 






















� > 0 
20 This answer can be arrived at intuitively, since the injurer avoids liability only in the outcome where 




� 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝑛𝑛𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑) + �
𝑛𝑛
1
� 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1(1− 𝑎𝑎)1 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑) +⋯+ �
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛 − 1
�𝑎𝑎1(1− 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑) + (1− 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛 ∙ 0 




  𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿) = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎∗)𝑛𝑛] + 𝑛𝑛𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎∗      (1) 
 
The first term reflects the discount on expected liability due to free riding and the 
second captures the total expected defense cost. 
 
Substituting the equilibrium suit probability, 
 
𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿) = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 �1 − 𝜆𝜆
𝑛𝑛




As the number of victims increases, 
 
 𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿) → 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(1 − 𝜆𝜆) = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�1 − 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝�. 
 
First, this is central to the argument of the previous part that litigation is plausible 
because of free riding.  Second, even though the probability of litigation by an 
individual goes to zero as the victim pool increases, expected liability remains positive 
because it depends on the probability that at least one will sue, which falls but stabilizes 
at 1-λ. 
 
Holding fixed the number of victims, expected liability shrinks to zero as the ratio of 
the plaintiff’s cost to the award gets closer to one.  This cost-induced deterrence 
collapse occurs more rapidly as the number of victims increases.21 
 
Expected liability increases as the award increases, both because of the direct effect and 
because of the indirect effect of increasing the probability of suit.  Expected liability 
falls as the plaintiff’s litigation cost increases, because of the effect on the probability 
of suit. 
 
Given the obstacles to settlement noted earlier, why wouldn’t the defendant pay off 
claims for full value by committing to a claims resolution facility (Ayres, 1990)?  If 
the defendant could credibly commit not to defend claims, then the litigation cost 
                                                             
 = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛] + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑 �𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + (𝑛𝑛 − 1) �
𝑛𝑛
1
� 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1(1− 𝑎𝑎) + (𝑛𝑛 − 2) �
𝑛𝑛
2
� 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−2(1− 𝑎𝑎)2 + ⋯+ �
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛 − 1
� 𝑎𝑎(1− 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1� 
 = 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛] + 𝑛𝑛𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑 �𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + �
𝑛𝑛 − 1
1
� 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1(1− 𝑎𝑎) + �
𝑛𝑛 − 1
2
� 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−2(1− 𝑎𝑎)2 + ⋯+ �
𝑛𝑛 − 1
𝑛𝑛 − 1
� 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1� 
which is equal to the expression for expected liability in the text. 








𝑛𝑛−1� 𝜆𝜆�𝑛𝑛𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑� < 0, 
which increases in absolute value with n. 
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barrier in the way of victims becoming plaintiffs would disappear.  Since the threat of 
litigation deters claims by maintaining the plaintiff’s litigation cost hurdle, a necessary 
and sufficient condition for litigation to be rational for the defendant is nv > E(L).22  
Substituting the equilibrium suit probability, litigation is rational if 
 
             𝜆𝜆
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛−1 > 𝜃𝜃 �1 − 𝜆𝜆
1
𝑛𝑛−1�                (2) 
 
which is plausible for small n and sure to hold for large n. 
 
3. Compliance Incentives 
 
Since deterrence does not collapse because of free riding, the remaining question is 
whether it is impaired.  This part considers first the question of perfect compliance 
with the legal standard, and second the question of socially optimal compliance. 
 
3.1 Perfect Compliance versus Socially Optimal Compliance 
 
The equilibrium outcome is one of perfect compliance (or perfect deterrence, or first-
best deterrence) if all injurers for whom  
 
 𝑥𝑥 < (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛                   (3) 
 
choose to take care.  This standard, which compares the cost of compliance to the 
social harm to victims directly resulting from noncompliance, is exemplified by the 
Hand Formula in tort law and other fault-based tests throughout the law.   
 
Given that litigation is costly, socially optimal compliance (or deterrence) occurs when, 
given a*, 
    
𝑥𝑥 < (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑛𝑛[𝑛𝑛 + 𝑎𝑎∗(𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑)]                  (4)  
In plain terms, compliance is socially optimal whenever the cost of compliance is less 
than the marginal social cost of failing to comply, taking into account the expected cost 
of litigation. 
 
3.1.1 Perfect Compliance 
 
An equilibrium of perfect compliance incentives holds when the social harm from 
noncompliance is the same as the expected liability from noncompliance: 
                                                             
22 This assumes that the claims resolution facility is costless and compensates in full.  In reality, such 
facilities are not costless and do not compensate perfectly, which can distort compliance incentives 
(Ayres, 1990). 
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(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞) ∙ 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞){𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎∗)𝑛𝑛] + 𝑛𝑛𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎∗}     (5) 
 
Undercompliance results if marginal social harm (left side) is greater than marginal 
liability, and overcompliance if the inequality is reversed.  This implies:   
 
Proposition 2: Undercompliance worsens with the number of victims and eventually 
becomes the norm as the number of victims gets large.  If the injurer can commit to a 
claims resolution facility (and therefore threaten litigation only when it is rational 
because aggregate harm exceeds expected liability), then overcompliance is never an 
equilibrium. 
 
The proof of this is straightforward.  Simplifying (5) and substituting the equilibrium 
suite probability, undercompliance results if condition (2) holds, and (2) holds more 
strongly as the number of victims increases.   
 
Undercompliance is due to free riding, whose effect might be mitigated if the litigation 
cost burden on the defendant could make up for the dilution of liability.  But given the 
vanishing likelihood of individual suit, the litigation cost burden cannot make up for 
the dilution due to free riding. 
 
From (5), the frontier along which incentives align with the legal standard (perfect 










which is shown in the Figure 1 simulations below.  The zone below the frontier is of 
undercompliance, and above the frontier, overcompliance.  If the defendant can 
costlessly commit to a claims resolution facility, the overcompliance zone would 
instead represent perfect compliance.  The simulations illustrate the rapid decay in 










   Figure 1: Compliance Effects of Litigation as the Number of Victims Increases 
 
   Notes: Horizontal axis: 0 < λ < 1; vertical axis: 0 < θ < 10.  Area below curve 
         represents undercompliance zone, above represents overcompliance. 
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3.1.2 Socially Optimal Compliance 
 
For compliance to be socially optimal, the marginal social cost from noncompliance, 
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞) ∙ 𝑛𝑛[𝑛𝑛 + 𝑎𝑎∗(𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑)] , must equal marginal liability, (𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞){𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 −
𝑎𝑎∗)𝑛𝑛] + 𝑛𝑛𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎∗}.  Since the former is greater than the latter this result cannot hold.  
Thus:  
 
Proposition 3: Compliance is always less than socially optimal.  This is because 
marginal liability is always less than the marginal social cost of noncompliance.  The 
degree to which compliance falls short of social optimality increases with the number 
of victims. 
 
The reason is that the injurer does not expect to pay for all of the harms, given the 
incentive to wait on the part of victims, and also externalizes litigation costs to 
plaintiffs.23  This is similar to the result that strict liability underdeters relative to the 
social optimum when litigation is costly (Hylton, 1990).  However, the strict liability 
underdeterrence result is due to the fact that litigation costs erect a barrier to some 
victims by creating negative value claims.  Here, litigation costs do not erect a barrier 
to any victim, because each has a positive claim.  It is the strategic interactions among 
victims that generates social underdeterrence.   
 
Underdeterence potentially could be solved by shifting the plaintiff’s costs to the 
defendant.  If such a shift were possible, then there would be no gain to a victim in 
playing the “wait” strategy.  All victims would sue, and the marginal social harm from 
noncompliance would be equal to marginal liability.24 
 
Calculating the welfare loss from socially suboptimal compliance would require 
information on the distribution of the compliance cost.25  However, since the welfare 
loss increases with the wedge between marginal liability and marginal social cost, 
which is (p-q)ncp, the loss due to free riding can be attributed generally to three factors: 
the productivity of care, the size of the victim pool, and the plaintiff’s cost of litigation. 
 
                                                             
23 Proposition 3 is obviously true in the negative-value claim scenario, so there is no need to limit its 
scope to the positive-claim scenario.   
24 There is a separate issue as to whether suit should be barred in order to enhance social welfare.  If 
expected litigation costs exceed the marginal deterrence benefit, then it may be optimal to bar litigation 
(Shavell, 1982). 
25 Let the distribution be G(x) with corresponding density g; let 𝑥𝑥 be the cutoff value equal to marginal 
liability, (5); and let 𝑥𝑥 be the cutoff value equal to marginal social cost of noncompliance, (4).  The 
welfare loss due to suboptimal compliance is 
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3.2 Example: Two Victims 
 
For two victims, A and B, the two pure strategy equilibria involve A suing and B waiting, 
or vice versa.  For the mixed strategy, if A sues his payoff is v – cp, and if he waits his 
payoff is 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 ; thus 𝑎𝑎∗ = 1 − 𝜆𝜆 .  Perfect compliance equates expected harm and 
expected liability, 1 = [(1 − 𝜆𝜆2) +  𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜆𝜆)], or 𝜃𝜃 =  𝜆𝜆
2
 1−𝜆𝜆 
.  This is the curve in 
the upper left of Figure 1, showing the balance between over and undercompliance 
incentives for different parameter values. 
 
4. Joinder of Plaintiffs 
 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 20 provides that plaintiffs may join in one action if 
“(A) they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect 
to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs will arise in 
the action.” 
 
Ex post (i.e., after suit is filed), permissive joinder advantages plaintiffs by reducing 
their joint litigation expenses.26 Joinder also reduces defendant’s expenses.  These 
effects have complicated implications for incentives.  First, from the defendant’s 
perspective, joinder may not be desirable ex ante because it encourages the filing of 
lawsuits.  It would seem that joinder should always be beneficial to plaintiffs ex ante, 
but it is not necessarily so.  By reducing defendant’s expenses, joinder may weaken 
deterrence, harming plaintiffs.  When the number of victims is large, however, the 
joinder and non-joinder policies have similar implications for the probability that an 
individual victim will sue. 
 
4.1 Probability of Suit with Joinder of Plaintiffs 
 
Proposition 4: Even with the prospect of joinder, the individual probability of suit 
approaches zero as the number of victims increases. 
 
Thus, the free rider incentive remains under joinder, and the probability of individual 
suit declines as the number of victims increases.  The reason is that although joinder 
reduces the plaintiffs’ litigation costs dramatically, it does not eliminate the incentive 
to wait to allow another victim to establish precedent.  Even with permissive joinder 
of plaintiffs, the victim who waits to file after liability has been established by the first 
litigants gains.  As long as there is an advantage to playing the “wait” strategy, 
deterrence is compromised.  Next, I compare expected liability under joinder and 
non-joinder.  
                                                             
26 Given the ex post advantage to plaintiffs, one could interpret the previous analysis of incentives 
under non-joinder as assuming that transaction costs prevent the plaintiffs from opting for joinder. 




4.2 Expected Liability with Joinder of Plaintiffs 
 
Comparing expected liability with joinder to the expectation where there is no 
joinder,27 
 
𝐸𝐸�𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗� = (1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛)(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑) 
𝐸𝐸�𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗� = 𝑛𝑛[𝑛𝑛(1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎∗)𝑛𝑛) + 𝑎𝑎∗𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑] 
 
where 𝑎𝑎� is the equilibrium probability of suit given that plaintiffs join and 𝑎𝑎∗ is the 
equilibrium probability of suit given that plaintiffs do not join.  Looking at the two 
expressions, it is unclear whether joinder of plaintiffs advantages defendants by 
reducing expected liability – that is, whether E(Lj) < E(Lnj).   
 
Just as in the non-joinder scenario examined previously, expected liability does not 
collapse in the joinder scenario as the number of victims increases, even though the 
probability of individual suit approaches zero.  Substituting the equilibrium suit 
probability in the non-joinder scenario, non-joinder advantages defendants ex ante if 
 
(1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛)(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑) > 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 �1 − 𝜆𝜆
𝑛𝑛















> (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛 
 
which may or may not hold.28  Thus, it is possible that joinder of plaintiffs could 
advantage injurers, and thereby reduce social welfare. 
 
Next, I offer an illustration with two victims of the conflict between the ex ante and 
ex post joinder preferences of injurers.  The illustration shows that the comparison 
between expected liability under joinder and non-joinder is generally ambiguous, 
depending on the ratio of the plaintiff’s cost to the award and the ratio of the 
                                                             




𝑛𝑛 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑) + �
𝑛𝑛
1�𝑎𝑎
𝑛𝑛−1(1 − 𝑎𝑎)1 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑) + ⋯+ �
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛−1�𝑎𝑎
1(1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1 ∙ (𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑). 
28 As n goes to infinity, non-joinder advantages defendants (relative to joinder) if 𝜆𝜆 > 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝑛𝑛→∞
(1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛, 
which may or may not hold, see appendix proposition 4. 
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defendant’s cost to the award. 
 
4.3 Example: Joinder with Two Victims 
 
For two victims, expected liability under the joinder and non-joinder policies are E(Lj) 
= (1-(1-𝑎𝑎�)2)(2v+cd) and E(Lnj) = 2[v(1-(1-a*)2)+a*cd] respectively, where 𝑎𝑎� 
= 2(1-λ)/(2-λ) and a* = 1 – λ.  The frontier of (λ, θ) values for which the defendant is 
indifferent ex ante regarding joinder and non-joinder is the boundary of the shaded 
region in Figure 2.  Within the shaded region, non-joinder is optimal ex ante for the 
defendant.29  In the white region, joinder is optimal ex ante for defendants, which 
could reduce welfare.  The implication is that where the defendant’s litigation costs 
are high relative to the plaintiff’s, joinder of plaintiffs likely advantages defendants 




Figure 2: Ex ante versus ex post joinder incentives 
 
 
4.3 Compliance under Joinder of Plaintiffs 
 
Here I consider perfect compliance and socially optimal compliance under joinder.  
Recall that undercompliance worsens and becomes the norm as the number of victims 
increases in the non-joinder setting. 
 
                                                             
29 E(Lj) > E(Lnj) in the regions 
0 < 𝜆𝜆 < 2 − √2  𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝜃𝜃 < −
(3 − 𝜆𝜆) ∙ 𝜆𝜆2
𝜆𝜆2 − 4𝜆𝜆 + 2
 
2 − √2 < 𝜆𝜆 < 1  𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝜃𝜃 > −
(3 − 𝜆𝜆) ∙ 𝜆𝜆2
𝜆𝜆2 − 4𝜆𝜆 + 2
 
Given that the boundary of the second region is to the right of λ = 1 for positive θ, Figure 2 provides a 
sufficient picture of the relevant region. 
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In the joinder setting, victims are more likely to bring suit, which could improve 
compliance.  Under joinder, compliance is less than perfect if 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 > 𝐸𝐸�𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗�, or  
 





which holds as n gets large.30  Thus, similar to Proposition 2, undercompliance 
worsens and becomes the norm as the number of victims increases.  Although 
joinder of plaintiffs may improve deterrence in some small numbers settings, the free 
rider incentive eventually overwhelms the plaintiff cost-reduction effect.  Again, if 
the injurer can commit to a claims resolution facility, overcompliance will not occur.   
 
Consider the question of socially optimal compliance.  It follows from the foregoing 
that social optimality is possible in the small numbers setting, but becomes less and 
less likely as the number of victims increases.  The shortfall from optimality worsens 




5.1 Limited Fund Litigation 
 
The basic model (2.1) assumes that the defendant has sufficient funds to compensate 
all victims.  In “limited fund” cases, by contrast, there are multiple victims against a 
defendant with a fund insufficient to compensate all of them (Spier, 2002; Miceli and 
Segerson, 2005).  The standard presumption is that victims race to the courthouse, 
resulting in unequal levels of compensation (Bone, 2003).31  If there is only enough 
to compensate m < n, and k < m sue, then waiting could be advantageous if v-cp < (m-
k)v/(n-k), though the standard race returns as n increases.  This suggests, consistent 
with Miceli and Segerson, waiting (here, free riding) could occur in the limited fund 
setting,32 especially if the fund size correlates with the number of victims.  Products 
liability claims exhibit this trait because the fund for compensation is likely to 
correlate with the number of victims who purchase the product.33 
                                                             
30 The left hand side of the inequality does not go to zero (appendix, proposition 4), while the right 
hand side does go to zero.   
31 Spier (2002), in a careful examination of limited fund litigation, focuses on settlement incentives and 
finds that externalities among plaintiffs can result in socially inefficient litigation.  For two plaintiffs, a 
race to the collect defendant’s assets in settlement occurs only when the correlation between their 
claims is low. When the correlation is high, settlement is less likely in the Spier model. 
32  Miceli and Segerson (2005), examining tort suits for exposure, find that waiting can occur in 
equilibrium in the limited fund scenario, where the first wave of exposure suits does not threaten to 
wipe out the defendant’s assets. 
33 Victims in these cases are similar to bank depositors whose withdrawals do not threaten the bank’s 




5.2 Class Actions and Social Optimality 
 
The class action emerges naturally as a potential solution to the shortfall in deterrence.  
The class action solves the free riding problem by binding all of the victims into one 
litigation unit.34  
 
One alternative to the class action is litigation cost shifting.  If all of the litigation 
costs borne by victims are shifted to the injurer, then no victim will have an incentive 
to free ride on the litigation of other victims.  However, it would be impossible to 
shift all of the costs borne by the plaintiff to the defendant.  As long as plaintiffs bear 
some special costs in litigating early, the strategic incentive to wait will remain. 
 
Another alternative to the class action would a memoryless court system in which 
late-filing victims/plaintiffs would be compelled to relitigate issues even against 
defendants who would rather settle.  This would eliminate the free rider incentive, 
but it would be infeasible. 
 
Consider the welfare potential of the class action.  Although I have assumed all 
victims have positive claims, I relax this assumption here.  Suppose the loss for each 
victim is the same and governed by the probability density h(v).  Since victims bring 
suit only when v > cp, the marginal social harm from failing to comply is (assuming 
the class action is not available) 
 
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞) ∙ 𝑛𝑛�𝐸𝐸(𝑛𝑛) + 𝑎𝑎∗(𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑��1 − 𝐻𝐻�𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝��} 
 
and marginal liability is 
 
                                                             
solvency even though its funds are limited, so that bank runs as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) are 
unlikely.  Breast implant litigation (e.g., Butler v. Mentor Corp. (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. 
Liab. Litig.), MDL-926) and bone screw litigation (e.g., Fanning v. AcroMed Corporation , MDL–1014) 
provide illustrations. 
34  In theory, permissive joinder might mitigate the free rider problem if courts denied offensive 
estoppel to late-filing plaintiffs who played the “wait” strategy, as suggested in Parklane Hosiery, 439 
U.S. at 330.  However, this would not eliminate free riding.  First, as a preliminary matter, Parklane 
Hosiery appears to deny offensive estoppel to the late-filing plaintiff only when he has waited for the 
purpose of having two bites at the apple, intending to bring his own claim if the first one fails.  The 
plaintiff who waits simply to wait is not such an opportunistic plaintiff under the theory of Parklane 
Hosiery.  Decisions after Parklane Hosiery have recognized exceptions to its suggested limit on 
offensive estoppel.  Second, and more importantly, if the defendant knows the outcome of later 
litigation (i.e., that he will lose) he will settle the follow-on suits, which would induce free riding, 
whatever the rule on offensive estoppel. 
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(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞){𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸(𝑛𝑛|𝑛𝑛 > 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝)[1− (1 − 𝑎𝑎∗)𝑛𝑛] + 𝑛𝑛𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎∗}[1 − 𝐻𝐻(𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝)]. 
 
Clearly, marginal social harm remains larger than marginal liability, as in the previous 
analysis that assumed positive value claims.  Availability of the class action alters 
marginal liability to 
 
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞){𝑛𝑛𝐸𝐸(𝑛𝑛|𝑛𝑛 >
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
𝑛𝑛





and alters marginal social harm to 
 





While, under the class action device, marginal liability is still smaller than marginal 
social harm for any given number of victims, the ratio of the two approaches one as 
the number of victim increases.  It should be clear that the positive claims scenario is 
a special case and conforms.  This suggests that the class action is the only feasible 
solution to the welfare loss due to free riding.35 
 
This argument also suggests a limitation.  Free riding is likely where positive value 
plaintiffs are alike.  Thus, a rule policing class actions for commonality, as in Wal-
Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011), could serve to limit class actions to settings 
where the deterrence benefit is most probable. 
 
5.2 The Monitoring Problem 
 
An important weakness in the class action device is that a lawyer managing such a 
suit may have an incentive to take a side payment from the defendant to “settle” (i.e., 
terminate) the case for a small or trivial payout to the class (Koniak 1995, Macey and 
Miller 1991).36  This problem is especially likely for negative-claim classes.  For 
example, suppose the plaintiff’s cost of litigation is $11 and each of 100 victims has 
suffered a loss of $10.  No victim would sue on his own.  The total class claim is 
$1000.  Since the issues of fact and law are common within the class, the total class 
litigation cost is only $11.  The lawyer, however, might choose to “settle” the case 
                                                             
35 Awarding supra-compensatory (punitive) damages to the first group of litigants could be another way 
to blunt the free riding incentive.  If the punitive component is at least as large as the cost of litigation, 
no victims would gain by waiting.  However, since courts award punitive damages only in special cases 
of malicious or reckless conduct, this approach to correcting incentives would fail to blunt free riding in 
the general case. 
36 In addition, a judge who must approve the settlement of a certified class may not have a strong 
incentive to reject a collusive settlement, given that any settlement reduces the court’s workload 
(Helland and Klick, 2007).   
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for a side payment of $200, and an award to the class of only $20. 
 
Indeed, the defendant and the plaintiff’s lawyer can always maximize their joint 
utility by arranging a side payment to terminate the case – that is, a collusive 
settlement.  Thus, if no one monitors the class lawyer, the lawyer’s optimal strategy 
is to take a side payment from the defendant.  More generally the probability of a 
side payment occurring is likely to be the complement of the probability of 
monitoring: P(side payment) = 1 – P(monitoring). 
 
To prevent a collusive settlement, some member of the class must therefore monitor 
the lawyer.  But any such monitor would incur costs to oversee the lawyer while 
receiving the same benefits as other class members.  Class members would therefore 
free ride on the monitor. 
 
The structure of the class action monitoring game is the same as that of the positive 
value litigation game analyzed in Part 2. Consider, for example, a class consisting of 
two victims/plaintiffs, with monitoring cost cm. 
 
 
 B’s Choice 
















  𝑛𝑛 −
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
2























which is the ratio of the cost of monitoring to the payoff to a class member. 
 
Using the same argument as for Proposition 4, the equilibrium monitoring probability 
within the class, 𝑎𝑎�, satisfies 
 
𝜎𝜎[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛] = 𝑎𝑎�[(1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛−1]𝑛𝑛 
 
As the number of plaintiffs within the class increases, the equilibrium probability of a 
class member choosing to monitor the class attorney approaches zero.37  However, 
the equilibrium probability that monitoring occurs is the probability that at least one 
                                                             
37 This follows from applying the argument in Proposition 4. 
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member of the class chooses to monitor.  This does not fall to zero, but converges to 
a value less than one.  Importantly, the probability of monitoring increases as the 
ratio of the cost of monitoring to the individual payoff from the class action, σ, 
decreases.38  
 
If the claims are all negative value, the collapse of the class action (due to collusive 
settlement) that results because of the absence of monitoring would leave the 
plaintiffs with no other recourse.  Their individual claims are worthless.  If the 
claims are all positive value, the collapse of the class action does not deprive the 
victims of the alternative of pursuing their claims individually.  But this returns us to 
Proposition 1: as the number of victims increases, the incentive to pursue individual 
positive-value claims falls to zero.  A more general proposition emerges: as the 
number of victims expands, the probability of individual actions falls to zero, 
degrading deterrence, and the probability of an effective class action weakens, also 
degrading deterrence.39 
 
Monitoring can be restored if the monitor receives an additional payment out of the 
class award to compensate him for the costs of monitoring.40  However, if it is the 
class action lawyer who permits the monitor to receive the award, then incentives for 
monitoring remain poor.  The class action lawyer has no incentive to fund an 
independent monitor.  The lawyer would prefer to appoint a monitor who will give 
him maximal freedom to take a side payment if he deems such an action desirable.41 
                                                             
38 Letting q = (1 - 𝑎𝑎�)n, the equilibrium monitoring probability condition can be expressed as: 





Since dq/dσ > 0, the probability that at least one plaintiff within the class monitors, 1-q, falls as σ 
increases. 
39 The dilution of deterrence described here does not imply that class actions will not be observed.  
Such lawsuits will continue, but with many ending in collusive settlements.  Because the per-victim 
payoff is lower for negative-claim classes than for positive-claim classes, monitoring is less likely in 
negative-claim classes.  Unmonitored class actions are likely to serve a transfer rather than deterrence 
function.    
40 On the efficiency of rewards as a solution to the “volunteer’s dilemma”, see Leshem and Tabbach 
(2016). 
41  Macey and Miller (1991) propose an auction of the class action right, with the lowest bidder 
prevailing as appointed counsel, to solve the agency cost problem described here.  While such an 
auction has an appealing simplicity, it would still generate some problems, as noted in Bebchuk (2002).  
The winning bidder may have erroneously underbid (winner’s curse), or may be ill prepared or 
inadequately motivated to secure a large judgment.  Moreover, the initial discovery and framing of a 
class action may require considerable effort on the part of an attorney.  If the right is then auctioned 
off, after an attorney has developed the claim, it is unclear how the originating attorney will be 
compensated for his effort, and whether such compensation would be sufficient to encourage future 
development of claims.  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 changed the law in 




5.3 Damages Unequal to Harm 
 
Another potential flaw in the class action device arises where the court award exceeds 
the harm.  In some cases victims who have suffered no harm, or very little harm, can 
obtain statutory damages and pursue class action litigation (Johnston, 2017).  
Statutory damages provisions are often included in consumer protection statutes.  In 
other cases, the victim pool includes individuals who suffered no harm (Brickman, 
2008). 
 
The deterrence implications of aggregate litigation with awards unequal to harm can 
be examined within the basic model set out previously.  Consider the scenario of 
individual lawsuits.  Let D be the damages award for each victim, ?̃?𝜆 = 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
𝐷𝐷
< 1, and 
let 𝜋𝜋 = 𝜕𝜕
𝐷𝐷
 be the ratio of the harm to the award.  The free rider incentive remains in 
this scenario.  However, the following deterrence result holds. 
 
Proposition 5: Compliance is socially optimal if and only if the award is equal to the 
sum of the plaintiff’s harm and litigation cost (?̃?𝜆 + 𝜋𝜋 = 1), excessive if greater (?̃?𝜆 +
𝜋𝜋 < 1), and inadequate if less (?̃?𝜆 + 𝜋𝜋 > 1). 
 
Damages that precisely compensate for harm is the special case where π = 1, and 
compliance is socially inadequate as shown previously.  Undercompensation of harm 
(π >1) clearly results in inadequate compliance too.  Since the no-harm case has π = 
0, it follows that incentives to comply are socially excessive when there is no harm,42 
the opposite of the underdeterrence result established under the assumption that the 
award equals harm.  The class action device only worsens the excessive compliance 
                                                             
securities litigation to require federal judges to appoint lead plaintiffs – on the theory that a judge-
appointed lead plaintiff would be more effective as a monitor than one chosen exclusively by the 
attorney (Choi, Fisch, Pritchard 2005).  However, even a court-appointed monitor would be afflicted 
by the free riding incentive and therefore shirk.  The empirical evidence indicates that among post-
PSLRA lead plaintiffs, only public pension funds appear to achieve above average results (Choi, Fisch, 
Pritchard, 2005).  This raises the question whether such funds are able to secure a greater private 
benefit from class action participation than other investors (Webber, 2010). 
42 Many of the class actions seeking disclosure or internal monitoring fall in the “no-harm” category, 
with a remedy that amounts to a positive award to the lawyers.  In In Re Subway Footlong Sandwich 
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. 16-1652 (7th Cir. Aug. 25, 2017), the Seventh Circuit rejected a class 
action settlement awarding $525,000 to the attorneys.  The lawsuit asserted Subway had harmed 
consumers by selling “Footlong Sandwiches” that sometimes fell short of 12 inches.  The Seventh 
Circuit concluded that the lawsuit yielded no benefit to consumers, who had not been harmed by 
Subway’s practices.  For a skeptical analysis of disclosure class actions in merger litigation, see In Re 
Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, Del.Ch., 129 A.3d 884 (2016). 





problem in the no-harm scenario. 
 
When ?̃?𝜆 + 𝜋𝜋 = 1, the real harm suffered by a prospective litigant is equal to the 
damages award, so that the award effectively removes the litigation cost hurdle that 
induces free riding.  Generally, the class action can enhance welfare in the case 
where compliance is socially inadequate.  Thus, even when the award exceeds harm, 
the class action may still be socially desirable if the excess amount is less than the 



















          Figure 3: Class actions with awards unequal to harm 
 
 
5.4 Application to Securities Litigation 
 
Securities litigation is a straightforward application for this model because positive 
value securities claims (e.g., fraud) available to multiple victims are not unusual.  
Most shareholders would have negative value claims, but institutional investors are 
likely to have positive value claims.  Moreover, free riding is potentially serious 
among institutional investors.43  Webber (2015) describes incentives of institutional 
investors to assume lead plaintiff status in class actions: 
 
Fidelity, Vanguard, and TIAA-CREF are some of the largest 
institutional investors in the world, and undoubtedly have enough 
exposure to obtain lead-plaintiff appointments if they pursue them. But 
                                                             
43 On free riding incentives among the major institutional investors (Blackrock, Vanguard, State Street 
Global Advisors), see Bebchuk and Hirst (2018). 
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they don’t. First, such funds are concerned about the cost of freeriding 
competitors, who are also likely to be class members….Hedge funds 
also avoid the lead-plaintiff role due to freeriding concerns. In 
addition, hedge funds tend to be secretive about their trading strategies 
and, thus, may be reluctant to subject themselves to the type of 
discovery that lead plaintiffs typically endure. 
  
The same free riding would distort incentives of institutional investors to sue in the 
absence of the class action device.  In view of the free riding incentive, this paper’s 
results – specifically the geometric decay shown in Figure 1 – suggest that if the class 
action device were not available the likelihood of undercompliance with securities 
laws would worsen with the size of the claimant pool.   
 
Take E(L)/nv = 1 + θ - (λ+θ)λ1/(n-1) as a simple measure of compliance efficiency.  If λ 
= θ = ½, then moving from three institutional investors to six reduces compliance 
efficiency from .79 to .62, that is, by 21 percent.  
 
5.4.1 Positive Theory of Opting Out 
 
Observers of class action litigation have noted that opting out of securities class 
actions by positive claimants has occurred more frequently, leaving the class 
consisting of negative claims (Coffee, 2015).44  The positive claims are large 
institutional shareholders, with multimillion dollar anticipated awards.  The decision 
to opt out typically occurs after a tentative settlement of the class action has been 
reached.  The negative claim class left behind by opt-out litigants is vulnerable to the 
monitoring problem: no victim has an incentive to monitor, so the lawyer is likely to 
enter into a collusive settlement.   
 
This model suggests that opting out reflects a type of symbiosis between positive and 
negative claim subclasses.  Recall that, holding the cost of monitoring fixed, 
monitoring is more likely as the individual payoff increases.  The entire combined 
class moves first, securing the outlines of a settlement through the monitoring of 
positive claimants, who then peel off to demand better terms.  Their ability to 
demand better terms is facilitated by the negative claimants’ credible threat to bring a 
class action.45  If the class action were barred, the negative claims would never be 
credible, and the positive claimants would then each face the strategic game of 
choosing whether to sue immediately or wait for some other claimant to sue first – 
                                                             
44 Che (1996) shows that the economics of opting out are potentially more complicated than the 
adverse selection account.  Pure adverse selection, leading to positive value claims opting out, is 
observed in Che’s model only when defendants have complete information on plaintiff claims. 
45 For example, the negative claims enhance the likelihood of satisfying the “superiority” requirement 
for certification – that is, that a class action be superior to other methods of suit, see Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). 
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that is, the scenario of Proposition 1 – with the resultant shortfall in deterrence. 
 
5.4.2 Additional Implications 
 
If the class action were abolished in securities litigation, the positive claimants, 
institutional investors, might still be compelled to sue because of their fiduciary duty 
to clients (Webber, 2015).  But each firm might defend a decision not to sue 
immediately on the ground that waiting could lead to a better return for clients than 
suing immediately.  This implies that the decay process modeled here would be 
observed in spite of the fiduciary duty.  Indeed, the fact that securities litigation is 
almost never seen anywhere in the world in the absence of a class action device is 
evidence in support of the hypothesis. 
 
The basic model of this paper assumes that some degree of compliance with the law is 
socially desirable.  In the securities field, this is admittedly an empirical question.  
If compliance is not socially desirable (e.g., no one is harmed), social welfare could 
be enhanced by prohibiting securities litigation, including class actions (Kraakman, 
Park, Shavell 1994).  Even if some degree of compliance is socially desirable, if the 
cost of litigation is sufficiently high it may be socially preferable to prohibit litigation 
(Shavell, 1982).  However, if such litigation enhances welfare up to a point, then its 




This paper shows that in the multiple victim scenario where the victims have positive 
expected value claims, the probability of an individual suit collapses with geometric 
decay as the number of victims increases.  This is because of the incentive to free 
ride, which increases with the number of victims.  In spite of this, the incentive to 
comply with the law does not collapse (as in the negative value claims scenario), 
though it is degraded.  Undercompliance results, and becomes more severe as the 
number of victims increases.  Compliance is always less than socially optimal.  
Permissive joinder of plaintiffs, even if it were possible in large numbers, cannot 
improve on these outcomes.  These findings suggest that the class action device may 
be the only feasible solution to inefficient undercompliance in the multiple victim 
scenario.  However, the very same strategic incentives that suggest that the class 
action may be socially preferable for deterrence purposes also suggest that class 
actions are inherently vulnerable to terminating in collusive settlements.  





A. Scope for settlement.  Assume positive transaction costs.  If n(v – cp) < E(L), 
then the injurer, given a choice to settle or litigate, would prefer to settle with each 
victim for v – cp.  This condition holds because  
𝑛𝑛�𝑛𝑛 − 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝� < 𝐸𝐸(𝐿𝐿) 
𝑛𝑛�𝑛𝑛 − 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝� < 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 �1 − 𝜆𝜆
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛−1�+ 𝑛𝑛𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑 �1 − 𝜆𝜆
1
𝑛𝑛−1� 
   0 < (𝜃𝜃 + 𝜆𝜆) �1 − 𝜆𝜆
1
𝑛𝑛−1�                    (A1) 
But the right hand side goes to zero as n approaches infinity, so E(L) approaches n(v – 
cp), and the gain from settlement diminishes geometrically with the number of 
victims.  Minimal transaction costs would therefore preclude settlement in the large 
numbers case, and unable to gain from settlement the injurer would not make an offer.  
Now consider the small numbers case.  Given the offer v – cp, the victim has a 
weakly dominant strategy to hold out for the settlement surplus.  To reduce holdouts 
the injurer could raise the offer to v – cp + δ, at which holding out would no longer be 
weakly dominant for the victim.  But the scope for such an offer is constrained – for 
example, if n = 8, λ = θ = ½, the total surplus as a percentage of aggregate harm (A1) 
is only 9 percent.  Second, transaction costs are likely to be substantial.  Consider 
two victims and let P represent the probability of acceptance instead of holding out.  
If Zδ represents the appropriable surplus from holding out given the common offer v – 
cp + δ, the proposed mixed strategy satisfies 𝑛𝑛 − 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝛿 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑛𝑛 + 𝑍𝑍𝛿𝛿) + (1 −





+ 𝜆𝜆)−1.  Because of the high holdout probability, modest 





Proposition 3: Subtracting marginal liability (5) from marginal social cost (4), 
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)�𝑛𝑛�𝑛𝑛 + 𝑎𝑎∗(𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑�� − 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎∗)𝑛𝑛] − 𝑛𝑛𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎∗} 
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)[𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎∗𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛(1 − 𝑎𝑎∗)𝑛𝑛] 
Substituting the equilibrium suit probability 
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞) �𝑛𝑛 �1 − 𝜆𝜆
1
𝑛𝑛−1� 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 + 𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝜆𝜆
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛−1� 
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑛𝑛𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝. ∎ 
 
Proposition 4: If a victim chooses to sue, under joinder, his payoff is: 
 





















− 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1�𝑛𝑛 − 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝� 
 
  








� 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛(1 − 𝑎𝑎)0 + �
𝑛𝑛
1
� 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1(1 − 𝑎𝑎)1 + ⋯+ �
𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛 − 1
� 𝑎𝑎1(1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1




(1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛) = 𝑛𝑛(1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎)𝑛𝑛−1) 
 
The equilibrium strategy 𝑎𝑎� therefore satisfies 
λ =
𝑎𝑎�𝑛𝑛(1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛−1
1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛
 
where 𝑎𝑎�(n, λ) < 1.  For the case where n = 2, 𝑎𝑎� = 2(1-λ)/(2-λ).  The equilibrium 
condition implies that 𝑎𝑎�n cannot go to zero or to infinity as n increases.  The 










� [1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛] = 𝑎𝑎�(1 − 𝑎𝑎�)𝑛𝑛−1 
 
Given the foregoing, this final expression implies that 𝑎𝑎� goes to zero.∎ 
 
Proposition 5: Marginal liability exceeds marginal social cost if: 
(𝑝𝑝 − 𝑞𝑞)�𝑛𝑛�𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 + 𝑎𝑎∗(𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝 + 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑�� < 𝑛𝑛𝜋𝜋[1 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎∗)𝑛𝑛] − 𝑛𝑛𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝑎𝑎∗} 
which is equivalent to ?̃?𝜆 + 𝜋𝜋 < 1. ∎  
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